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ABSTRACT
The Japanese began their modernization efforts under duress, at a time when the major p>owers of the
time reached the Far East in their quest to open up and carve up the less developed areas of the world,
imposing "unequal treaties" on Japan as well as on China. Unlike China and virtually every other
country at that time, Japan responded very effectively to this challenge. Within a generation, it had
developed sufficiently through free trade, however manipulated, to emancipate itself from all restrictions
on its sovereignty and to pursue instead openly protectionist and imperialist ambitions, which were
focussed on East Asia. As a result. East Asia's share of Japan's external trade, which became more
and more coterminous with the Yen-bloc share, grew dramatically, especially during periods of imperial
expansion. The development of a protected "co-prosperity sphere" evidently benefitted Japan more
than its dependencies but served to accelerate their development as well by all indications, relative to
that experienced by the unoccupied parts of East Asia.

Synopsis
Japan was drawn into Che "mi listream" of modern economic development
relatively late, in the mid-nineteenth century. As latecomers to this
experience, the Japanese became the most avid students not only of the
Western technology and commerce to which they were being exposed (and
of the civilization that had created them), but also of the imperial-
istic politics which had made Tokugawa Japan submit to that exposure.
Moreover, in their efforts to emancipate themselves from such imposi-
tions and to achieve for Japan eventually a status comparable to that
of the dominant powers of the time, the Japanese began to emulate
those powers—notably Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United
States—by pursuing opportunities not only for "free trade" but also
for empire building.
In the circumstances, these two approaches appeared sequentially
interdependent. In order to be able to assert themselves effectively
at some future time, the Japanese first had to modernize and develop
to some extent. This required Japan's participation in international
trade on Western terms whose domestic consequences could be and were
modified by government fiscal and regulatory interventions. The
acquisition of the new technology, which involved substantial outlays
for purchases of new producer goods in addition to the payments for
purchases of new or cheaper consumer goods from abroad, depended on
the earnings from the export of numerous traditional products.
Although the most prominent among those items, raw silk and tea, were
much in demand in both Europe and North America, other countries found
more ready markets on the Asian mainland because cultural similarities
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made them more attractive there. China in particular thus became
right away a customer as well as a source of primary products. In
that latter capacity more than in the former, it was soon joined by
British India.
As Japan's development progressed, both the composition and the
direction of its trade began to change. In relative terms, exports of
primary products diminished while their imports grew, and exports of
finished goods rose while their imports fell. In this context, Japan
also became less of a business partner and more of a competitor for
the industrialized nations of the West, vying with them in third
markets to sell more and more similar modern manufactures and to buy
the raw materials for their production. The less developed areas of
Asia—in addition to China and India especially the Southeast and
Oceania—became the principal arenas for this competition.
Whereas China thus appeared as merely one of several major markets,
it held special promise not so much because of its proximity and cul-
tural affinity but because of its potential for political dependency.
By the raid-nineteenth century, China—like Japan—had been forced to
accept "unequal treaties" which limited its sovereignty. But the
impositions were more far reaching, and China coped with them much
less effectively. As a consequence, it was forced time and again to
cede territory and to give up claims to overlordship over adjacent
states besides foregoing tariff autonomy and allowing ever more
foreign "treaty port" enclaves on its territory as well as granting
extraterritoriality rights to the citizens of the Western treaty
powers. By the late nineteenth century, when Japan felt sufficiently
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strong to realize imperial ambitions, the various treaty powers had
begun to vie with each other for railroad concessions in related
spheres of influence.
The treaty powers shared the privileges which each had extracted
from China through the institution of the most favored nation clause.
Japan, which had failed earlier to obtain comparable concessions
peaceably, remained disadvantaged until it waged war on China and
defeated it in 1895. As the newest treaty power, it not only acceded
to all previously imposed rights but added to them new Chinese con-
cessions on inland navigation and treaty port industrialization. In
addition, it forced China to cede Taiwan (Formosa) and to give up its
claim to overlordship over Korea (Chosen). By its victory in the sub-
sequent Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 1905 secured Russia's acquiescence
in its colonization of Korea. Russia also had to transfer its rights
to the Kwantung Leased Territory and to the southern section of the
Chinese Eastern Railway Zone (renamed the South Manchuria Railway
Zone), which it had prevented Japan from acquiring ten years earlier.
During the course of one decade less than 50 years after its for-
cible opening, Japan thus managed both to emancipate itself and to
establish its empire. By adding to the impositions on China, it
asserted itself sufficiently to regain its territoriality rights over
foreigners and its tariff autonomy. At the same time that it acquired
Taiwan and Korea as colonies, it therefore also possessed once again
the power to practice protectionism overtly.
The Japanese used this power soon not only to promote their
further domestic industrialization per se but also to institutionalize
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preferences, e.g., for Taiwanese sugar and Korean rice imports into
Japan proper as well as for the export of Japanese manufactures to
these colonies. As a consequence, the shares of Taiwan and Korea in
Japan's total trade increased rapidly, and their development acce-
lerated as well. Eventually in the 1920s, imperial preferences were
extended even to the Kwantung Leased Territory, evidently also in
order to protect the intermediate position of Japan. The subsidiza-
tion and regulation of shipping and shipbuilding facilitated this
integration, assuring that most of the trade to and from Japan as well
as within the empire was carried in Japanese bottoms.
While Japan thus followed the lead of most Western powers in form-
ing and protecting strategic interests both at home and in its newly
acquired possessions, China remained open per force to almost all
foreign trade and investment with hardly any restrictions, and the
Japanese at once did their part to keep it that way. Because of this
institutionalized inequality between countries, China's trade and
investment were distorted as well, in inverse relation. To the extent
that Japan—like other treaty powers
—
promoted exports relative to
imports and exports of manufactured consumer goods in exchange for
imports of raw materials for industrial production, it induced China
to conform by buying and selling accordingly without intervention. By
implication, it also encouraged in China the (development of) produc-
tion of exportable primary products relative to that of importable
manufactures. The growth of import substituting manufacturing in
China required in such circumstances unusual product differentiation
or cost advantages in order to proceed.
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Although Japan competed with all other countries everywhere in
China, it evidently developed regional interests and advantages, in
accordance with its empire building strategy. Hong Kong as the
entrepot for South China and the South China region generally were
important trading partners during the pre-emancipation period but lost
favor thereafter, as that region's trade tended to stagnate. Shanghai
as the entrepot of the Yangtze Valley and the Central China region
retained its significance as the arena where Japan contended with the
United States and secondarily Britain for this largest and most dyna-
mic part of the China market. North China and even more so Manchuria
with their principal ports of Tientsin (Tianjin) and Dairen (Dalian),
respectively, were the regions where the Japanese began to predominate
after their success in the Russo-Japanese War. Under the law and
order assured by the Kwantung Array and through the agency of the South
Manchuria Railway Corporation, Japan developed not only the trade but
the entire economy of the Kwantung Leased Territory, the railroad
corridor, and adjacent areas in forms that were not so different from
its colonial practices, though tempered by the multilateralism of the
treaty provisions.
In terras of its overall share of the China market, Japan surpassed
most of its competitors—notably the U.S. —in the late 19th century
and began to rival Great Britain with its colony Kong Kong on the eve
of World War I. Japan's China trade, along with its trade and develop-
ment generally and China's trade and development as well, received a
boost during the war, when the Western powers' preoccupation with it
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and the extraordinary increase in shipping costs made import substitu-
tion, export expansion and larger market shares easier to achieve.
Setbacks followed with the competitors' return after the war, of
course. Most lasting threats arose in addition because of China's
advancing political reconstitution, which resulted in its successful
negotiation of tariff autonomy in 1928, 30 years after Japan had
regained as much or more for itself. Japan at first accepted the
change reluctantly, because it stood to lose more than the other
powers from China's new protectionism—which resembled that practiced
by Japan, needless to add.
The coincidence of China's new protectionism with the Great
Depression and its effects on trade was too much for the Kwantung Army
to take. Instead of accommodating itself to China's eventual emanci-
pation, as the Western powers did, Japan embarked on the opposite
course of expanding its empire in order to preserve its established
advantage. Manchuria, long dominated "informally" within the treaty
system, was redefined as a minority territory under Chinese rule since
the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and reconstituted as a separate
country, Manchoukuo, in 1931. As a Japanese satellite, it was inte-
grated into the Yen bloc and experienced under Japanese hegemony a
remarkable development, thanks to major Japanese resource commitments
as well as policy revisions which had appeared contrary to Japanese
domestic interests before.
The pattern of Japan's trade with Manchuria changed notably for
these reasons. To be sure, the established exchange of various manu-
factured products (notably textiles, wheat flour, sugar) for various
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primary products (notably soya beans, bean cake, coal) continued and
became more exclusive in response to tariff revisions. In addition,
however, Japan now supplied large quantities of industrial investment
goods, which in many instances were not yet fully competitive with
Western products and consequently could not be sold profitably else-
where. Their supply on capital account increased Japan's export
surplus dramatically and turned Manchuria's small trade surplus
overall into a very large trade deficit. Manchuria's trade with most
other parts of the world tended to diminish unless it came to be con-
ducted under bilateral agreements, as with Germany. But it continued
until the onset of World War II and remained essential for the imple-
mentation of the development strategy, given Japan's technological and
resource limitations.
Japan's forcible creation of Manchoukuo did not provoke immediate
war with China and did not keep Japan from continuing to exercise its
remaining treaty power rights in the residual Chinese territory. That
territory's trade declined in value during the early 1930s under the
combined influence of the depression and the drastic raises in tariff
rates. The quantity of imports decreased, and the share of producer
goods among them increased. The quantity of exports increased, and
other agricultural products (oil seeds, oil, eggs and egg products in
particular) replaced soya beans and bean cake as the principal food-
stuffs sold abroad. Japan's shares of the territory's exports and
imports held fairly steady in relative terms and continued to yield a
trade surplus, albeit of much smaller magnitude. But the relative
constancy implied absolute declines in Japan's trade with North,
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Central and South China, which offset the advances in the trade with
Manchuria. The combined shares of Manchoukuo and the Republic of
China in Japan's total trade contracted somewhat as a result.
Sino-Japanese trade relations changed more significantly soon
thereafter, when Japan's determination to extend its hegemony over
China further and to obtain for itself as in Manchoukuo privileges
with respect to trade and investment finally brought on the Second
Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45. Japan's military advances, resulting in
the rapid occupation of most coastal provinces and the increasing iso-
lation of "Free China" in the interior, made it possible to impose
those terms without much delay or consideration of the other treaty
powers' interests. In response to such measures and the incorporation
of the new North China Federal Reserve Bank system into the Yen bloc,
Japan's exports to "Occupied China" increased dramatically while its
imports from that territory declined in absolute and relative terms.
At issue remains whether the consequent export surplus was actually
unintended or a variant of the old policy of exporting more to China
while importing more from other parts of the world, since China's
currency remained convertible for some time and other countries, espe-
cially the United States, Southeast Asia and India, sold more to
"Occupied China" than they bought from it. As a share of total
Japanese imports, those from the entire mainland (Manchoukuo plus
Occupied China) approached once again previously common levels while
exports to it exceeded any previously experienced percentage of total
Japanese sales abroad.
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The formerly internal trade between Manchuria and the rest of
China passed through substantial changes in response to the initial
political separation and subsequent reintegration within the Yen bloc.
Because of the imposition of tariffs on both sides, the trade between
the two entities declined very much during the early 1930s, exports
from Manchuria to China falling even more than imports from China into
it. With the Japanese occupation of North China in particular,
exports to China increased once again and approached the level of the
late 1920s by the late 1930s. Imports from China increased also, but
not enough to prevent the reemergence of a large export surplus, which
had been characteristic of pre-Manchoukuo times as well. Manchuria
thus contributed notably to the import surplus of "Occupied China."
The pattern of exchange may not have been affected greatly by the
political events. Manchuria continued to export to China primarily
coarse grains, soya beans, bean oil, bean cake and coal while it
imported primarily rice, wheat flour, tea, tobacco, cotton and paper
from it.
On the eve of the Pacific War, Japan thus had succeeded in trans-
forming most of East Asia—all of which had once been part of the
Chinese Empire in name if not in fact—into a set of colonies, satel-
lites and occupied territories. On all of these entities—Taiwan,
Korea, Kwantung Leased Territory and SMR Zone, Manchoukuo and even
North China—Japan imposed institutions and regulations which biased
their external trade flows in favor of the metropolitan territory as
the ultimate or intermediate origin or destination. As a consequence,
even the direct trade between dependencies appears to have remained
-10-
or become smaller than it would have been in less restricted cir-
cumstances, and the share of the entire empire in the total trade of
all dependencies appeared correspondingly overly large. The benefits
of free trade obviously could not materialize fully under such condi-
tions, and the dependent populations in particular paid for that,
involuntarily.
However, the biases which Japan imposed did not favor simply an
exchange of Japanese-manufactured consumer goods for colonial raw
materials. They also gave rise to a protected empire-wide market for
Japanese-made producer goods, which were not yet competitive in free
markets. By supplying such goods to both the dependencies and the
metropolitan territory, economies of scale could be realized in their
production, and the production of primary products as well as their
processing could be increased and improved in both locations. As a
consequence, most dependencies experienced a process of "dependent"
development, which also was clearly "second best" in their circum-
stances and not necessarily the choice of the dependent populations.
At times and especially during the 1930s, this process was accelerated
by massive Japanese investments, which assured, e.g., that the
Manchurian economy grew from 1924 to 1941 at roughly the same four
percent per annum which the Japanese economy experienced. Korea and
Taiwan also achieved similar growth rates at least since the time of
the First World War.
Moreover, the integration of economic relations within the empire
proceeded gradually, and the empire as a whole did not achieve a high
degree of autarky—except for lack of alternatives during the final
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phase of the Pacific War. Until then, Japan as well as its dependen-
cies continued to export to the rest of the world products which were
competitive in order to pay for imports which could not be produced
internally on acceptable terms. As the intermediary in this process
and as the territory that was most in need of inputs from the more
industrialized countries under the strategy, Japan resorted to trade
with the world outside its empire more than any of its dependencies
did, with the exception of newly "Occupied China" during the Second
Sino-Japanese War. China then as well as before its occupation was
one of the major markets where export surpluses were achieved by
Japan, which helped to pay for its import surpluses from Europe and
North America.
The following sections will document this transformation of
Japan's economic relations with the various parts of East Asia that
need to be distinguished. They will also discuss specific features of
these relations in greater detail than this synopsis has done. The
conclusion to the paper will address in addition some of the evalua-
tive issues which the Japan experience poses.
The Growth and Structural Transformation of Japan's Trade
Japan's trade with the rest of the world has been reported systemati-
cally for the years since 1868. The reported data imply high rates of
increase in the values of exports and imports not only per se but also
relative to the value of national income, which grew rapidly as well
(at approximately four percent per annum in real terras) in comparison
with the value of national income in other countries. Trade clearly
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appeared as the engine of growth, which increased more rapidly even
than the value added by Japan's secondary (manufacturing plus) sector
until the early post-World War I years. Its share in national income
fluctuated during the 1920s and declined slowly during the 1930s under
the impact of the depression and all governments' responses to that
event (Table x.l).
At their height toward the end of World War I, Japan's exports and
imports each accounted for somewhat more than 20 percent of its
national income. Moreover, both exports and imports consisted of
large varieties of goods with relatively small domestic market shares.
Lockwood concluded for this reason that
... For most Japanese industries the export market
played a subordinate role throughout the prewar
(WWI) decades. Also, it tended to absorb goods not
essentially dissimilar in character from those
widely consumed at home. The pattern varied widely
from industry to industry, however, and the total
impact of world demand in intensifying the rate of
Japanese industrialization was highly significant.
2
Lockwood 's generalization appears to fit even the most prominent
export items, viz., raw silk at all times, supplemented first by tea
and subsequently by cotton yarn and cotton fabrics. The most promi-
nent import items—textiles, sugar, raw cotton—seem to have been
similarly marginal to domestic production:
... On the whole, however, the destructive impact
of imported foreign manufactures on the traditional
handicrafts seems to have been neither very pro-
nounced, nor very widespread. It was slight by
comparison with the inroads made in later years by
Japan's own developing factory industries.
3
The latters' effects on the structure of Japan's foreign trade are
made evident in Table x.2. The export shares of foodstuffs and raw
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Table x.
1
THE SHARE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN JAPAN'S NATIONAL INCOME
Unit: Percent of National Income Produced
as estimated by Kazushi Ohkawa
eriod All Areas Ko rea Taiwan China Hong Kong East Asia
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
873-80 4.6 5.7 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9
881-85 5.5 4.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
886-90 8.1 7.9 1.3^ 1.2^ 1.6 1.5
891-95 10.1 9.3
0.3^ 0.2^
0.8 1.6 1.5 0.7 2.3 2.3
896-00 10.4 13.9 1.6 1.6 1.8 0.6 3.7 2.4
901-05 13.8 16.2 0.5 0.4 3.0 2.0 1.3 0.2 4.8 2.7
906-10 14.9^ 15.9'^ 0.7 1.0 3.4 2.2 0.8 0.0 4.9 3.3
911-15 16.8 17.0 1.1 0.7 1.0 1.2 4.0 2.3 0.7 0.0 6.8 4.2
916-20 21.3 20.1 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.3 4.8 3.5 0.6 0.0 7.6 6.2
921-25 16.2 20.8 1.5 2.1 0.8 1.4 3.5 2.9 0.5 0.0 6.3 6.4
926-30 18.1 20.4 2.2 2.4 1.0 1.7 3.5 2.8 0.5 0.0 7.1 6.9
931-35 17.8 18.7 2.8 2.6 1.2 1.9 3.0 2.1 0.2 0.0 7.3 6.6
936-40 17.6 16.6 3.9 2.6 1.3 1.7 4.9 2.2 0.1 0.0 10.2 6.5
erived from Hundred-Year Statistics of the Jap.anese Economy, compiled by the Statistics
epartment of the Bank of Japan, July 1966, pp. 32, 278-279, 290-292.
1889-90: Including, as before. Hong Kong.
Average, 1897-1900.
1910: Excluding Korea.
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Table x. 2
JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE BY CATEGORY''
Unit: Percent of Total Exports/Imports
Food Stuffs Raw Materials1 Fabricated Finished 0ther
Period Raw Materials Goods Commod ities
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
1868-70 32.2 44.3 24.9 4.3 40.9 18.6 1.2 31.1 1.9 1.7
1871-75 39.0 14.4 17.5 3.8 36.6 21.5 3.1 56.6 3.8 3.8
1876-80 38.0 13.5 11.8 3.7 41.5 27.6 4.8 51.9 3.8 3.4
1881-85 31.5 19.1 11.9 4.0 45.6 29.0 8.0 45.7 3.0 2.2
1886-90 26.5 19.7 11.7 7.5 45.0 28.6 13.1 42.3 3.7 1.9
1891-95 18.5 21.7 9.8 20.8 44.7 20.1 23.5 34.9 3.5 2.5
1896-00 13.0 23.3 11.7 26.7 46.6 17.7 25.7 30.9 3.0 1.4
1901-05 12.2 24.8 9.4 32.9 46.1 15.5 29.6 25.3 2.7 1.5
1906-10 11.2 14.6 9.3 39.7 46.7 18.5 31.2 26.3 1.5 0.8
1911-15 10.8 12.1 7.8 51.9 49.4 18.2 30.6 17.1 1.4 0.7
1916-20 8.9 10.3 5.6 52.8 41.3 24.4 42.2 11.9 2.0 0.7
1921-25 6.3 14.2 6.1 49.9 47.9 17.6 38.4 17.7 1.3 0.7
1926-30 7.7 13.8 5.4 54.8 42.1 16.0 42.8 14.6 1.9 0.8
1931-35 8.1 9.2 4.2 60.2 29.4 17.1 55.7 12.7 2.7 0.8
1936-40 10.1 8.7 4.4 51.8 26.0 25.9 57.3 12.9 2.4 0.7
Derived from Hun<ired-Year Statistics of the Japanese Econcimy, compiled by the
Statistics Department of the Bank of Japan, July 1966, pp. 280-281.
Excluding Korea and Taiwan, which are counted as Japanese territory.
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materials, which accounted for the oajor share of the export value in
the beginning, declined almost continuously to less than 15 percent of
the total. The export share of fabricated raw materials, which con-
sisted at first primarily and after the turn of the century largely of
raw silk, fluctuated until the 1930s, when it declined notably, largely
because of a fall in the export share of raw silk. The export share
of finished goods rose rapidly to offset the decline in the shares of
foodstuffs and raw materials. Until World War I, this rise appears to
have been attributable primarily to the growth of textile goods sales
abroad. In subsequent years and especially during the 1930s, it
reflected mostly the increase in industrial producer goods exports.
The last development would be even more apparent if sales to Korea and
Taiwan were included in the tabulation.
On the import side, this pattern of change was matched by an
almost continuous fall of the share of finished goods and a similarly
continuous rise in the share of raw materials. The import share of
fabricated raw materials fluctuated like their export share around a
fairly constant trend, but at half the level. The import share of
foodstuffs, which might have been expected to increase continuously as
well, decreased after 1905. It would have continued to rise if pur-
chases from Taiwan and Korea had been included. But this change
would not have been very pronounced, either, because of Japan's pro-
tection of domestic food production when that activity began to
experience serious threats from foreign competition. Except for this
retarding influence of protectionism, Japan's foreign trade evidently
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experienced a very rapid structural transformation during the course
of its extraordinary growth.
The Size and Characteristics of Japan's East Asia Trade
At the beginning of the Meiji Restoration, Japan's trade with China
accounted for almost all of its East Asia trade, and the Bank of Japan
one hundred years later reported it as such. The trade with Hong
Kong was counted as part of the China trade until 1889. The trade
with Taiwan was also part of it until Taiwan became a Japanese colony,
Q
the statistical separation appearing in 1897. The coverage of the
trade with Korea prior to 1910, when Korea became a Japanese colony,
is uncertain. Another source reports the following percentage shares
of Japan's total exports and imports for the pre-colonial period:
Period Exports to Korea Imports from Korea
1877-86 1.2% 1.3%
1877-96 1.9% 3.0%
1897-06 (inferred) 5.0% 2.6%
1907-16 (inferred) 5.5% 4.3%
The subtotals for "East Asia" and "Others" in Table x.3 may have to be
adjusted accordingly. The data for China after 1931 continue to
include the exports and imports of the Kwantung Leased Territory and
of Manchoukuo with the SMR Zone.
The amendments and corrections to Table x.3 may add to the rela-
tive size of Japan's East Asia market during the late 19th century,
but they do not modify the table's indications greatly thereby.
China, successively net of Hong Kong, Taiwan, possibly Korea, but not
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Table x. 3
I EAST ASIA'S SHARE IN JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Unit: Percent of Exports/Imports
2riod China Hong Kong Taiwan Korea East Asia Others
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
B73-75 21.8 32.8 21.8 32.8 78.2 67.2
376-80 19.5 19.3 7 7 19.5 19.3 80.5 80.7
381-85 18.5 21.1 ? 7 18.5 21.1 81.5 78.9
386-90 20.2 15.0 13.2^ 6.5^ 7 7 20.2 18.3 79.8 81.7
391-95 7.4 16.8 14.9 8.0
2.7^ 1.4^
? 7 22.3 24.8 77.7 75.2
396-00 15.3 11.7 16.9 4.6 7 ? 35.0 17.5 65.0 82.5
901-05 21.5 12.6 9.8 1.1 3.5 2.8 7 7 34.8 16.5 65.2 83.5
906-10 22.6 14.1 5.2 0.2 4.9 6.1 7 7 32.7 20.4 67.3 79.6
911-15 23.7 13.6 4.4 0.2 6.0 7.3 6.5 3.9 40.6 25.0 59.4 75.0
916-20 22.5 17.6 2.9 0.1 4.0 6.7 6.1 6.3 35.5 30.7 64.5 69.3
921-25 21.3 14.1 3.4 0.0 4.7 6.7 9.5 10.0 38.9 30.8 61.1 69.2
926-30 19.3 13.7 2.5 0.0 5.5 8.2 12.1 11.8 39.4 33.7 60.6 66.3
931-35 17.1 11.2 1.4 0.1 6.8 10.1 15.5 14.1 40.8 35.5 59.2 64.5
936-40 27.9 13.5 0.8 0.1 7.3 10.3 21.8 15.6 57.8 39.5 42.2 60.5
srived f rom Hund red-Year Statistics of the Jap)anese Economy, pp. 278 -279, 290, 292 •
1889-90.
1897-00.
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Manchuria, accounted with some variations fairly steadily for about 20
percent of Japan's exports and 15 percent of its imports. Hong Kong
also was more important as a destination of sales than as a source of
purchases, and it rivaled China in both respects during the late 19th
century. But its importance as a place of trade for Japan was short-
lived. Japan's trade with it declined rapidly while the trade with
the colonies expanded from very small beginnings to very substantial
magnitudes. This protected market in Taiwan and Korea matched Japan's
open market in China by the mid-1920s and surpassed it soon thereafter.
Moreover, unlike the trade with China, the trade with Taiwan registered
import surpluses until the end of the period and the trade with Korea
exhibited such surpluses until the depression. Within China, the trade
with Manchuria developed on the same pattern until the formation of
Manchoukuo, when Japan began to invest heavily in the region.
In combination, these developments accounted for an increasing
share of East Asia in the total value of Japan's external trade, from
about 20 percent during the late 1870s to almost 50 percent during the
late 1930s, with spurts after the achievement of treaty power status
in China, during World War I, and during the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Moreover, whereas Japan's total exports tended to fall short of its
total imports more often than not, exports to East Asia exceeded
imports from East Asia at most times, frequently by substantial frac-
tions. Both relations are indicated by the data of Table x.l, which
gives an impression of East Asia's importance in terms of national
income shares. Exports to and imports from the area initially
accounted for one percent of Japan's national income each. They grew
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to 10.2 percent and 6.5 percent of it, respectively, during the co-
prosperity years 1936-40.
Changes in the commodity composition of Japan's trade with East
12Asia have been studied in detail by Mizoguchi Toshiyuki. His find-
ings may be summarized as follows:
1. Japan's exports to China prior to the First Sino-Japanese War con-
sisted mostly of marine products, mineral products, metals and metal
products, chemicals, and textiles—in that order. Soon after the war,
textiles became the dominant item which accounted for more than half
of the total exports to China during 1907-26. Their share fell sub-
sequently but contributed a quarter of Japan's exports to China even
during the 1930s. Chemicals as well as metals and metal products
remained important commodity export groups, no doubt structurally
transformed. They were supplemented by processed foods and rapidly
rising supplies of machinery as important categories.
2. Because textiles dominated among Japan's exports generally, their
regional concentration ratio (RCR) was not high in the case of China.
In fact, it was much less than unit value there as well as for Taiwan
and Korea. But Japan's textile exports consisted mostly of raw silk,
which were shipped primarily to Europe and North America. Net of raw
silk, therefore, the RCR's were higher in East Asia, but much above
unit value only in China during 1907-26, when Japan rapidly replaced
Britain as the principal supplier of imported cotton yarns and fabrics.
3. Other export groups with continuously high RCR's in all three ter-
ritories were chemicals, metals and metal products, machinery, and
other manufactured goods, for the reason that Japan protected the
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provision of such producer goods in its colonies and provided them
increasingly to Korea and Manchuria, leaving areas outside East Asia
with little more than one third of all their exports from Japan.
Exports of primary goods achieved high RCR's during the 1930s in the
colonies but not in China, which remained a principal supplier of such
products.
4. Japan's imports from China consisted at first primarily of agri-
cultural products and secondarily of processed foods. Agricultural
products retained their predominance, although their share fell from
two thirds to less than one half of the value of all imports from
China. But their structure changed, textile raw materials being
replaced by cereals as the predominant item. Processed foods lost
their importance after the First Sino-Japanese War, when sugar from
Taiwan had become a colonial product. In their place, chemicals
appeared as the second most important category, chiefly in the form of
imports of natural fertilizer, which eventually lost in relative terms
while other chemicals, metals and metal products, and mineral products
gained correspondingly, especially during the 1930s.
5. The RCR's show continuously high values for Japan's imports of
crude cereals from China, Taiwan and Korea. In addition, China was
more than proportionately important at first as a source of textile
raw materials and eventually as a supplier of other raw materials and
producer goods. Taiwan provided other manufactured (consumer) goods
to an extremely disproportionate degree as well. Otherwise the region
tended to be underrepresented among the suppliers of Japan's imports.
In the case of China, Japanese imports of crude cereals, other raw
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materials and producer goods tended to come disproportionately from
Manchuria.
The Growth and Structural Transformation of China's Trade
China's trade with the rest of the world is on record since 1864. It
grew notably over the years though not nearly as rapidly as Japan's
foreign trade did. The following average annual changes in the values
(measured in haikuan taels) and the quantity indices of China's
13
exports and imports indicate the pace of change:
Average annual H. K. T. values of Quantity indices of
change during Exports Imports Exports Imports
1868-1895
1895-1913
1913-1929
1913-1931
The rapid growth of imports relative to exports during 1895-1913 re-
flects the wave of mostly direct foreign investment that followed the
First Sino-Japanese War. The difference between the 1913-29 and
1913-31 rates of change points to the effects of the depression and
the tariff reform.
China's international trade seems to have grown faster than its
national income did, but for lack of adequate data, the magnitude of
this relation is in dispute. Aggregate real output increased accord-
ing to Perkins at 1.4 percent per annum during the period 1914-18 to
1933 and according to Yeh at 1.1 percent per annum during the period
3.2% 3.8% 2.5% 2.2%
5,9% 6.9% 2.3% 4.4%
5.9% 5.1% 2.5% 2.1%
4.6% 5.3% 1.8% 1.5%
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1914-18 to 1931-36. Rawski has taken issue with both estimates,
concluding instead that China's real gross domestic product grew prob-
ably more rapidly at 1.8 to 2.0 percent and perhaps even at 2.3 to 2.5
percent per annum during the latter period. Rawski 's revision tends
to imply that the share of international trade in China's national
income did not rise appreciably during those years. However, such a
rise is indicated for the longer interval from the 1880s until 1933,
and its relative magnitude appears to be consistent with the range of
GDP growth rates derived by Perkins and Yeh. Chang Chung-li's GNP
estimate for "the 1880s" yields GNP shares of 2.8 percent for exports
and 3.3 percent for imports during that decade. Feuerwerker 's modifi-
cation of Chang's estimate serves to reduce these shares to 2.3 percent
and 2.7 percent, respectively. The Liu-Yeh estimate for GDP for the
Chinese mainland in 1933, which also accounts for Manchuria, implies
GDP shares of 3.3 percent for exports and 5.9 percent for imports when
the international trade of Manchoukuo (net of that with the Republic
of China) is added to the international trade of the ROC (net of that
with Manchoukuo )
.
China's slower economic growth by any of the measures resulted in
a more protracted structural transformation which is evident in the
three sets of output estimates as well. Rawski 's findings do not
differ much from those of Perkins and Yeh in this respect because his
upward revisions of the sectoral growth rates affect all sectors but
one and the traditional ones relatively more than the modern compo-
nents. The slower shift from primary production to "manufacturing
plus" reflected itself in turn in a similarly limited change of the
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composition of China's exports and imports, which is indicated by the
percentage shares of Table x.4. Like the Perkins, Yeh and Rawski
estimates, these data cover the years since (the eve of) the First
World War, when the effects of China's beginning industrialization
became noticeable.
Prior to this period, China's exports consisted initially almost
entirely of tea and silk plus silk goods. Their shares in total
exports declined fast while those of beans, bean cake, oil seeds, oil
and a growing variety of other agricultural products rose to supple-
ment them. Extractive materials such as coal, ores and metals
accounted for relatively small shares at most times but gained notably
during the First World War and the Second Sino-Japanese War. Until
the loss of Manchuria, the export shares of foodstuffs and of manu-
factures tended to remain fairly stable while that for raw materials
grew and the one for semi-manufactures fell. After the formation of
Manchoukuo, increases in the exports of foodstuffs (oil seeds etc.)
substituted for decreases in the exports of semi-manufactures (bean
cake etc.), and the export of manufactures (from Shanghai) increased
on the eve of World War II.
Among China's imports, opium ranked first until the late 19th cen-
tury, but gradually lost out to cotton goods, cotton yarn, and an
increasing variety of other products, most of them consumer goods.
During the period covered by Table x.4, imports of cotton goods and
yarn began to be replaced by those of raw cotton, and imports of
numerous industrial producer goods (liquid fuel, transport materials,
chemicals, metals, machinery) increased in value relative to other
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Table x. 4
CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE BY CATEGORY'
Unit: Percent of Exports/Imports
Food Stuffs Raw Materials Semi- Other
Year & Be^/erages Manufactures Manufactures Commodities
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
1913 17.4 18.1 29.1 5.3 38.7 26.7 12.2 40.4 2.6 9.5
1916 16.9 22.5 24.7 7.7 43.2 26.2 11.0 40.5 4.2 3.1
1920 20.6 11.5 23.9 9.3 37.5 30.7 14.6 47.0 3.4 1.5
1925 13.9 23.3 31.3 15.4 38.9 21.8 13.8 38.1 2.1 1.4
1928 15.7 22.5 35.4 13.9 34.8 20.1 13.3 31.9 0.8 1.5
1931 15.0 22.6 37.7 21.7 32.5 19.7 13.6 34.4 1.0 1.6
1936 24.7 11.0 35.8 13.4 23.2 22.3 16.3 44.2 9.1
1937 21.4 13.9 37.7 8.2 24.7 22.8 16.2 55.1
1938 21.2 23.9 40.9 7.3 18.6 17.7 19.3 51.1
1939 23.7 28.8 34.4 19.2 16.8 16.1 25.1 35.9
1940 21.2 30.7 33.5 20.0 15.9 16.3 29.4 33.0
Source: Yu-kwei Cheng. Foreign Trade and Indus
t
rial Deve lopment of China.
Washington, D.C.: University Press of Washington, D.C., 1956, pp.
136.
1936-40: Excluding Manchuria.
Including living animals.
35,
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goods. The data of Table x. 4 points to progress in import substitu-
tion more generally. The import shares of semi-manufactures and manu-
factures tended to fall while that of raw materials tended to rise.
Deviations from those trends—and from the tendency of the foodstuff
share to remain rather stable—occurred primarily during the period of
military action at the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War.
East Asia's Changing Position in the China Market
East Asia's shares of these exports and imports are made evident in
Table x. 5. The data, which include China's trade through Hong Kong
and with Siberia among the "others," thereby focusing on the emerging
Japanese Empire, indicate that Japan's share of China's trade grew
very rapidly from the 1880s until the period of the First World War,
contracted somewhat during the 1920s, and declined more strongly
during the 1930s, following the loss of Manchuria and the outbreak of
the Second Sino-Japanese War. China's trade with Korea developed with
a lag and at a much lower level on a similar pattern, but its balance
was positive most of the time, unlike the one with Japan. China's
trade with Taiwan, which was included in the trade with Japan from
1895 until 1930, appears to have been relatively small at all times.
China's trade with Manchuria, which became international after the
creation of Manchoukuo, decreased in response to the erection of
20
tariff barriers and the territory's integration into the Yen bloc.
In toto, the share of Japan-dominated East Asia rose from about two
percent in the raid-1860s to one third of China's entire foreign trade
during the First World War years, when it peaked.
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Table x. 5
EAST ASIA'S SHARE IN CHINA'S INTERNATIONAL TRADE
Unit: Percent of Exports/Imports
Period Japan Ko rea Taiwan Kwant ang a. East Asia Others
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp
1864-65 0.6 3.8 0.6 3.8 99.4 96.2
1866-70 2.3 3.2 2.3 3.2 79.7 96.8
1871-75 2.1 3.7 2.1 3.7 97.9 96.3
1876-80 2.7 4.5 2.7 4.5 97.3 95.5
1881-85 2.4 5.1 0.1^ 0.0^ 2.5 5.1 97.5 94.9
1886-90 4.1 5.5 0.3 0.1 4.4 5.6 15.6 94.4
1891-95 8.0 6.0 0.5 0.1 8.5 6.1 91.5 93.9
1896-00 9.7 11.3 0.5 0.4 10.2 11.7 89.8 88.3
1901-05 14.0 13.1 0.7 0.3 14.7 13.4 85.3 86.6
1906-10 14.9 14.2 0.8 0.4 15.7 14.6 84.3 85.4
1911-15 16.9 20.5 1.4 0.8 18.3 21.3 81.7 78.7
1916-20 27.6 34.6 2.9 1.6 30.5 36.2 69.5 63.8
1921-25 25.8 24.4 3.7 1.1 29.5 25.5 70.5 74.5
1926-30 24.0 26.7 5.1 1.2
3.4<^ 0^
29.1 27.9 70.9 72.1
1931-35 19.7 14.4 3.0 0.4 1.0 0.3 1. 27.1 16.1 72.9 83.9
1936-40 9.3 20.9 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 4.3 3. 8 15.3 26.6 84.7 73.4
Derived from Hsiao Liang--Lin. China's Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864 -1949. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1974, pp. 22-24, 152-156.
Kwantung Leased Territory representing Manchoukuo.
Including Hong Kong and Siberia.
^Average, 1883-85.
Average, 1932-35.
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Trade relations with Japan did not develop similarly in all parts
of China, and regional foci changed during the evolution of Japan's
commercial policy. Its emphasis shifted from Hong Kong and South
China during the pre-treaty power years to Shanghai and then to
Manchuria and North China after the Russo-Japanese War. By the 1920s,
more than 40 percent of the Japan trade involved the Northeast, close
to 25 percent the North, more than 30 percent Central China, and
merely two percent the South. The concentration ratios for these four
regions indicate that on the eve of the creation of Manchoukuo, trade
with Japan predominated in the Northeast and North but not in Central
21
China and not at all in the South.
Imports from Japan 1919 1927 1931 1936
Manchuria
North China
Central China
South China
Exports to Japan 1919 1927 1931 1936
Manchuria
North China
Central China
South China
A comparison of the RCR's for exports and imports reveals in addition
that during the 1920s, Manchuria and North China tended to become more
dependent on Japan for their imports but not for their exports.
1.78 1.94 2.85
1.69 1.67 2.04 2.53
0.82 0.80 0.69 0.82
0.07 0.19 0.20 0.39
1.95 1.54 1.63
2.41 1.66 1.27 1.88
0.60 0.60 0.59 0.90
0.06 0.22 0.01 0.03
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The regional distribution of China's Japan trade was in large
measure commodity specific. In terms of major export items, the re-
orientation from the South and Central parts to the North and
Northeast involved shifts from (Taiwan's) sugar and from raw cotton to
soya beans, bean cake, coal and pig iron, e.g., whose production and
marketing developed rapidly in South Manchuria under Japan's "informal"
domination and management. Imports from Japan, which consisted pre-
dominantly of textiles since the late 19th century, were more widely
dispersed in terms of destination, as were other consumer goods.
Investment goods, however, followed more clearly the directions of
proprietary interests and flowed disproportionately into the Kwantung
Leased Territory, the SMR Zone, and eventually other parts of
Northeast and North China.
China's trade with Korea and Soviet Siberia was concentrated even
more on the Northeast. The trade with Siberia, which consisted mostly
of exports of soya beans, bean cake and grains as well as imports of
coal, iron and steel, gunny bags, cotton piece goods, and sugar during
the late 1920s, ceased soon after the creation of Manchoukuo and the
Soviets' sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway, as indicated in Table
X.6. The trade with Korea, which at most times appeared statistically
as part of the trade with the Japanese Empire, involved in particular
exports of millet, bean cake, and raw wild silk as well as imports of
cotton piece goods and yarn, clothing and sugar during the late 1920s,
attesting to Korea's more advanced industrialization as well as to its
22
transit location in the trade with Japan. The data of Table x. 5
would show increases during the 1930s if the transactions of Manchoukuo
-29-
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Table x. 6
EAST ASIA'S SHARE IN MANCHURIA'S EXTERNAL TRADE
Unit: Percent of Exports/Imports
2ar Japan Koirea U.S..S.R. Hong Kong Ch ina East Asia
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp,
929 39.7'' 42.1^' ? 7 9.7 4.8 7 7 21.8 29.1 71.2 76.0
?30 29.4 37.9 10.7 3.4 12.8 5.1 1,7 4,2 26.3 32.6 80.9 83.2
931 33.6 39.9 5.0 3.1 9.6 6.6 1.6 3,9 31.2 30.2 81,0 83.7
932 30.7 54.0 2.9 4.3 5.5 2.3 0.9 2.7 27.5 18.3 67.5 81.6
933 40.8 60.8 7.2 5.1 3.0 1.5 1.5 0.7 13.0 15.5 65.5 83.6
934 38.4 64.6 10.4 4.3 1.9 0.8 1.5 0.8 14.6 9.7 66.8 80.2
935 43.6 71.9 8.0 3.7 1.1 0.2 1.8 0.5 15.5 5.3 70.0 81.6
936 39.4 73.3 7.2 3.9 0.3 0.0 1.4 0.7 21.3 6.9 69.6 84,8
937 42.9,
62.5^
69.5^
70.7,
73.2^
84.8^
88.8°
6.9 4.4 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.5 17.6 4.4 68.7 80,1
938 ? 7 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 18.6 5.5 74.8 78.8
)39 ? 7 - - 0.0 0.0 16.8 3.7 82.8 88.5
940'^ 9 7 ~ ~ 0.0 0.0 25.6 4,3 95.1 93,1
mrces: The Manchuria Ye ar Book, 1931, 1932--33; The Manchoukuo Year Book, 1934, 1942; The
Japan-Manchoukuc. Year Book, 1935, 1939.
'ncluding Taiwan,
including in addition Korea.
fanuary to September.
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were added Co those of the Republic of China. By implication, the
declining shares of exports and imports indicate one of the conse-
quences of the territorial loss.
Manchuria's Evolving Japan Trade
As a frontier region which was severely underpopulated as well as
underdeveloped at the time of its opening, Manchuria grew rapidly in
response to the immigration of labor as well as the importation of
capital and the imposition of (Japan's) law and order, beginning with
the colonization of the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South
Manchuria Railway Zone and ending with the forcible creation of
Manchoukuo as a satellite state. The quantitative dimensions of this
development have been studied by Kang Chao, whose work will be the
23principal reference for the following observations. His series of
export and import values implies in addition that Manchuria's trade
began to accelerate notably already under Chinese rule and Russian
^ . . 24domination:
Average Annual Change Exports Imports
1872-1893 7.6% 4.4%
- 1896-1903 8.5% 13.5%
1872-1903 7.7% 7.0%
1907-1931 13.2% 7.9%
1931-1939 1.7% 23.0%
1907-1939 10.1% 11.5%
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During Japanese times, Manchuria's trade expanded on the familiar
cyclical pattern: Very rapid growth from 1907 through the First World
War, followed by stagnation in its wake and renewed growth during the
later 1920s, terminated by the depression. In contrast with the rest
of China, however, exports increased more rapidly than imports did at
most times, exceptions being the initial railroad construction period
from the late 1890s until the Russo-Japanese War and the years of
intensive Japanese investment in Manchuria's industrialization during
the 1930s. During that latter period, the rate of growth of exports
fell to unprecedentedly low levels in current terms. In real terras,
25
exports apparently peaked in 1931-32 and declined notably thereafter.
Prior to its separation from the rest of China, Manchuria thus
contributed a rapidly increasing share of China's total exports, its
percentage rising from 16.8 in 1913 to 35.4 in 1931. The share of
imports on the other hand fluctuated around a fairly constant trend,
9 A
changing from 11.3 percent in 1913 to 10.7 percent in 1931. Exports
also must have risen relative to Manchuria's gross domestic product
while imports may have accounted for a more constant share. After
1931, of course, these relations were reversed when the growth of
imports accelerated dramatically and that of exports decelerated
greatly, probably turning negative in real terms. Because these move-
ments tended to offset each other, the GDP share of total trade appar-
ently did not change much during the years 1924-41, while the terri-
tory's real output grew at 4.2 percent per annum on the average. Yet
it remained fairly stable at a surprisingly high level, exports
-32-
accounting for 17 percent and imports for 22 percent of the terri-
tory's GDP in 1934.^''
Until the 1930s, this rapid economic growth did not result in a
significant structural transformation. Agriculture plus (fishing,
forestry, and subsidiary production) continued to contribute about 50
percent of the GDP, and the share of manufacturing plus (mining and
construction) increased very slowly. The composition of exports and
imports remained correspondingly stable. Soya beans, bean cake and
bean oil, which had supplied 87 percent of all export value in 1872,
29
still provided 60 percent of this total on the eve of the separation,
supplementary export items of major importance by then being millet
30
and raw wild silk, as well as coal and pig iron. Imports consisted
of a larger and increasing variety of goods, yet textiles, wheat flour,
sugar, alcoholic and tobacco products accounted for close to half of
the total import value during the late 1920s, iron and steel, machinery
31
and vehicles adding merely 15 percent to it.
Table x. 6 shows that this trade was heavily concentrated on East
Asia, before as well as after the separation. It also indicates, how-
ever, that the East Asian trade partners' shares of exports and
imports changed substantially in response to the establishment of
Manchoukuo as a Japanese satellite state. Trade with Soviet Siberia,
which had not been negligible, ceased. Trade with Hong Kong, which
had been much less important, became practically insignificant.
China's trade shares declined, especially on the import side. Accord-
ingly, Japan's trade shares rose greatly also in particular on the
import side. Japan thus replaced China as a source of imports but not
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as a destination of exports, even during the years of war-related
autarky. Japan's colony Korea apparently did not share much in this
development and remained more important as a buyer of Manchurian prod-
ucts. " '
'
Table x.7 shows in addition that during the mid-1930s at least,
Manchuria depended on Japan disproportionately much for supplies of
manufactured goods and disproportionately little for sales of raw
materials, which China provided in comparatively large shares. On the
export side, Japan appeared as a customer for larger than average
shares of semi-manufactures while Korea concentrated its purchases on
foodstuffs and China on foodstuffs and manufactured goods. As a con-
sequence of the territorial separation, the commodity structure of
Sino-Manchurian trade thus changed notably, China losing its estab-
lished markets for manufactures to Japan. But Japan and its colonies
could not meet all of Manchuria's requirements equally well, and
countries outside East Asia therefore remained particularly important
as buyers as well as sellers of raw materials.
The industrialization efforts of the 1930s accelerated the process
of structural transformation of the Manchurian economy and its trade.
Both import and export substitution progressed more rapidly then before;
In 1932, production goods imports constituted
22.3 percent of total imports while imports of
consumption goods amounted to 77.7 percent of total
imports. However, the percentage of production
goods imports has increased gradually until in 1937
production goods amounted to 39.4 percent and con-
sumption goods to 60.6 percent, a trend which indi-
cated the increasing importance of production goods.
In 1938, 1939 and 1940 this trend continued. This
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Table x.
7
EAST ASIA'S SHARE IN INTERNATIONAL EXTERNAL TRADE BY COMMODITY GROUP
Unit: Percent of Group Total
Exports to Import s from
Japan Korea China East Asia Japan Korea China Hong Kong
Foodstuffs, Beverages, Prepared Tobacco
46.13 31.05 14.01 91.19
34.49 37.11 25.16 96.76
42.48 29.94 23.32 95.74
59.14 7.45 6.20
57.36 7.81 12.86
63.82 10.80 9.26
Raw Materials
39.36 6.78 8.90 55.04
27.59 5.97 8.70 52.26
41.59 5.27 4.07 50.93
33.76 6.75 14.24
34.04 5.01 17.69
20.91 5.37 13.62
Raw Materials for Further Manufacturing
57.36 4.23 13.11 74.70
60.44 4.11 11.90 76.45
61.20 3.57 9.08 73.85
Wholly or Mainly Manufactured Goods
46.80 10.72 38.16 95.68
46.31 7.31 43.15 96.77
36.70 13.46 38.35 88.51
1.08
2.64
1.86
0.96
1.13
0,90
65.20 1.89 5.12 0.64
73.25 3.26 3.76 0.76
62.60 2.82 2.05 0.81
84.43 2.09 3.50 0.11
85.73 2.61 3.58 0.07
83.37 3.28 2.48 0.05
ource: Far East Year Book , 1941, p. 652.
Note the omission of Hong Kong, which was the recipient of less than two percent of
Manchuria's exports during 1935-37. See Table x.6.
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fact is a natural reflection of the internal activ-
ities in Manchoukuo, going on in the industrial,
mining and construction fields. ...32
This change in proportions resulted first of all from the addi-
tional acquisition of large amounts of iron, steel and machinery. But
it also involved decreases in the importation of wheat flour because
of the increased milling of domestic grains, increases in the importa-
tion of raw cotton and raw jute as imports for the growing textile
industry, etc. On the export side, the changes were less dramatic,
but the exports of coal and pig iron decreased, e.g., apparently be-
33
cause they could be used to a greater extent in domestic production.
The progress in industrialization was achieved by very substantial
external resource commitments, which Japan made in the form of the
previously mentioned import surpluses. During the Manchoukuo period,
in fact, Japanese investments in the territory varied closely with its
trade deficit.
The Reorientation and Expansion of Taiwan's Trade
The Manchurian experience resembled in many respects that of Taiwan
during the initial phase of its colonization, when its economy and its
trade were restructured to accommodate Japan's needs and interests.
As indicated before, Taiwan's international trade was part of the
foreign trade of China until the First Sino-Japanese War and part of
the trade of the Japanese Empire thereafter. It has been studied and
discussed in detail by Samuel P. S. Ho among others, in the context of
35his work on the economic development of Taiwan. The following state-
ments will be based mostly on this source.
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During the pre-colonial period, Taiwan's trade grew rapidly until
1880 and fluctuated without any further gain until the outbreak of the
First Sino-Japanese War, with setbacks especially during the Sino-
French War of the early 1880s. Exports, whose volume apparently
increased at close to 15 percent per annum during 1868-1880, consisted
primarily of sugar, a traditional crop destined for China and Japan,
and tea, a new crop shipped mostly to America, tea replacing sugar as
the dominant export during those years. Rice also appeared as an
important item, but its shipments were not fully recorded. Imports,
whose volume increased at more than 10 percent per annum during the
same period, consisted predominantly of opium from India and the
Middle East and secondarily of textiles, initially from Britain and
then from Japan. The relative importance of opium diminished while
that of a growing variety of other consumer goods increased. During
the entire period, Taiwan's trade tended to be fairly balanced, its
growth driven by the expanding overseas markets for tea.
After Taiwan's colonization by Japan, the regional pattern, volume
and composition of its external trade all changed greatly. Within a
decade, Japan replaced the Chinese mainland as the principal trade
partner and retained this predominant position until the end of the
period, as Table x. 8 makes clear. Yet the trade with China remained
important whereas the trade with the rest of the world, widely dis-
persed as it was, became less significant over time, especially since
the First World War. Likewise within a decade of the takeover, the
balance of Taiwan's total external trade and of that with Japan became
37
notably positive while the balance of its China trade turned negative.
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Table x.
8
EAST ASIA'S SHARE IN TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL TRADE
Unit: Percent of Exports/Imports
Year J
a
Japan China East Asia
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1897 14.2 22.6 66.9 45.1 81.1 67.7
1900 29.5 38.2 52.3 27.3 81.8 65.5
1905 56.4 55.3 20.6 22.1 77.0 77.4
1910 80.0 59.5 6.2 11.9 86.2 71.4
1913 75.7 70.2 5.4 12.5 81.1 82.7
1915 79.6 76.0 6.6 15.0 86.2 91.0
1919 80.0 58.6 7.2 20.9 87.2 79.5
1920 83.7 65.0 5.5 19.3 89.2 84.3
1925 81.8 69.7 10.4 17.5 92.2 87.2
1929 87.8 68.5 6.9 15.5 94.7 84.0
1930 90.6 73.2 4.4 14.0 95.0 87.2
1935 89.6 82.9 5.0 11.6 94.6 94.5
1939 86.0 87.5 11.8 9.0 97.8 96.5
1940 81.1 88.4 16.6 8.3 97.7 96.7
Source: Derived from Samuel P. S. Ho, 1Iconomic Deve lopment of Taiwan,
1860-1970
. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978, pp.
392-393.
.Including Korea.
Including Manchuria at all times.
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Taiwan's incorporation and integration into the Japanese Empire
induced a rapid economic expansion and transformation which became
evident in the changes of its territorial income and trade. The fol-
lowing estimates of average annual growth rates indicate the adapta-
T Q
tion to Japan's pace:
NDP in 1937 prices, 1911-35 4.3 percent
GNE in 1934-36 prices, 1905-35 4.5 percent
Export volume index, 1905-35 7.4 percent
Import volume index, 1905-35 6.0 percent
The share of external trade in Taiwan's gross national expenditure
increased rapidly as a consequence, to more than 50 percent in 1935.
After 1935, most aggregate indicators tended to stagnate or decline,
thereby lowering the long run average growth rates until 1940 by
perhaps one percent. At the same time, however, industrial production
continued to spurt, as it did in Manchuria and in Korea, though with-
out resulting in comparable balance of trade deficits.
Japan's principal economic objective was to turn Taiwan into its
primary source of sugar and a major source of rice, tropical fruits,
and raw materials—rather than of tea, which continued to appeal to
Chinese and Westerners instead. The effective pursuit of this goal,
which involved the development of agricultural production and produc-
tivity in those directions, of processing industries for those crops,
39 .
and of an appropriate physical and social infrastructure, is ulti-
mately evident in the composition of Taiwan's exports and imports
during the colonial period. The data in Table x.9, which have been
-39-
Table x. 9
TAIWAN'S EXTERNAL TRADE BY CATEGORY
Unit: Percent of Total Exports/Imports
Period Food, processed Other consurap- Raw material
and unprocessed tion goods for production
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
Material for
construction
Exp. Imp.
Machinery,
equipment
:,xp. Imp.
1896-00 76.8 32.9 18.7 39.5 4.3 19.0 0.2 8.1 0.0 0.5
1901-05 74.1 27.7 21.2 41.6 4.4 17.1 0.2 12.4 0.0 1.3
1906-10 80.3 22.8 14.9 35.5 4.6 19.4 0.2 20.1 0.0 2.2
1911-15 77.3 30.2 12.7 28.7 9.7 23.7 0.4 14.9 0.0 2.6
1916-20 77.7 29.8 8.3 24.4 12.9 30.0 0.9 10.6 0.1 5.2
1921-25 82.9 32.2 6.6 26.6 8.2 27.4 2.2 9.6 0.1 4.1
1926-30 84.6 28.5 6,9 28.7 6.8 28.2 1.6 9.2 0.1 5.5
1931-35 86.5 21.8 5.4 29.6 7.1 32.4 0.9 9.4 0.1 6.7
1936-38 89.1 24.0 5.0 28.9 4.7 26.9 1.0 13.4 0.3 6.8
Source: Toshiyuki Mizoguchi, "Foreign Trade in Taiwan and Korea under Japanese Rule,"
Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics
,
Vol. 14, No. 2 (February 1974), p. 40.
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compiled and processed by Mizoguchi, show that exports consisted pre-
dominantly and increasingly of foods (sugar, rice, and other products,
in that order), which were destined mostly for Japan. Other consumer
goods and raw materials for production (in particular alcohol) added
relatively little to them. Exports of construction materials, machi-
40
nery and equipment remained insignificant throughout the period.
Taiwan's imports consisted mostly of manufactured products, most
of which came from Japan. The import shares of foods and of other
consumer products (in particular textiles) remained relatively large
and stable. The share of raw materials for production rose during the
second decade because of the importation of agricultural inputs such
as fertilizers, including bean cake from Manchuria. The share of
construction material imports fluctuated, rising rapidly first when
the infrastructure had to be developed during the first decade and
again on the eve of the Second World War. The share of machinery
imports increased more steadily but remained relatively small even
during the 1930s. '^''"
To reorient and develop Taiwan's economy and external trade as
indicated, Japan committed substantial resources especially during the
initial years of the colonial period. Taiwan's balance of trade defi-
cit with Japan during the first decade no doubt understated the magni-
tude of Japan's investment. Soon thereafter, however, this relation
changed:
Taiwan was an economic asset to Japan not only
because it was a source of food and raw materials,
but equally important, because Japan was able to
obtain Taiwan's primary products without exchanging
an equivalent value of manufacturing goods. Except
-41-
for the first decade of its occupation, Taiwan
exported substantially more than it imported. From
1916 to 1944 Taiwan's export surplus (here defined
in the conventional manner) as a share of its export
averaged 26 percent. Because Taiwan's trade was
mostly with Japan, the export surplus was essen-
tially to Japan's advantage. The very large and
persistent export surplus was made possible because
in Taiwan the income distribution decision was
largely in Japanese hands. The real wage in Taiwan
was kept low, so total consumption as well as im-
ports of consumer goods also remained low. Profit,
on the other hand, was high. Part of the profit
was reinvested in Taiwan, but much of it was trans-
ferred to Japan. '+2
The empire-wide protection of agricultural products certainly enhanced
this distributive effect, at the expense of the Japanese consumer.
Korea's East Asia Trade
Unlike the trade of Taiwan, Korea's external trade did not require
much redirection toward Japan after 1910. Soon after the Meiji
Restoration, Japan in 1876 pressured Korea into opening its borders
and proceeded at once to pursue its commercial interests, in competi-
tion and conflict first with the Souzereign China and then with Russia.
By the time Japan resolved these conflicts by force and colonized
Korea, the composition of trade and Japan's preponderance as a trade
partner were already well established. Information on Japan's involve-
ment in Korea's foreign trade during the pre-colonial era appears,
e.g., in the decennial reports of the Chinese Maritime Customs for the
treaty ports of Jenchuan (Chemulpo, now Inch 'on), Fusan (Pusan), and
Yuensan (Wonsan) during 1882-91. The expansion and restructuring of
this trade during the colonial period has been summarized by Paul W.
Kuznets. His work will serve as one of the basic sources for the
-42-
following comments, together with Mizoguchi's previously cited article
on the "Foreign Trade in Taiwan and Korea under Japanese Rule."
During the triennium 1907-09, Japan accounted for close to 66 per-
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cent of Korea's total trade. Table x.lO demonstrates that during
the following three decades, its predominance increased, though it
dominated Korea's exports more than its imports. Korea's trade with
China, which consisted mostly of trade with Manchuria, developed on an
unusual pattern that needs to be considered in the context of changes
in the composition of trade. The share of exports to China fell until
the raid-1920s and rose thereafter while the share of imports from
China during the same periods first rose and then fell. Both changes
are distorted by transit shipments (between Japan and Manchuria). The
shares of exports to and imports from other countries both declined
very rapidly, the former to insignificant levels by the end of World
War I. The external trade of Korea thus appeared even more focused on
the Japanese Empire than that of Taiwan and the one of Manchoukuo.
Korea's integration into the Japanese Empire, like that of Taiwan,
generated rates of growth of output and trade comparable to those of
Japan. During the interval 1910/12 - 1939/41, Korea's net commodity
product grew on the average at 3.9 percent per annum and the volume of
its trade at 8.6 percent per annum. The trade ratio therefore
increased rapidly as well and exceeded 50 percent during the 1930s.
Unlike the growth of Taiwan, that of Korea occurred primarily in the
non-agricultural sector, so that manufacturing plus raining increased
their share in the net commodity product from 8.2 percent during
-43-
Table x. 10
EAST ASIA'S SHARE IN KOREA'S EXTERNAL TRADE
Unit: Percent of Tj^t^l Exports/Imports^
Period Japan China Other Countries
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
1910-12 73.7 62.4 16.8 10.1 9.5 27.5
1914-16 79.9 67.5 13.0 12.9 7.1 19.6
1919-21 89.9 64.4 8.8 23.7 1.2 11.9
1924-26 93.1 68.0 6.6 24.3 0.3 7.7
1929-31 91.4 76.5 8.2 15.9 0.4 7.6
1934-36 87.7 84.8 11.6 10.8 0.7 4.4
1939-41 77.4 88.3 21.2 4.8 0.4 6.9
Source: Suh Sang-Chul, "Growth and Structural Changes in the Korean
Economy Since 1910," tables 11-11 and 11-14, as quoted by
Paul W. Kuznets, Economic Growth and Structure in the
Republic of Korea . New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1977, p. 10.
.Three-year averages based on current values.
Including Manchuria and areas in North China occupied by Japan.
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1910/12 to 36.9 percent during 1939/41 while agriculture's share
decreased from 84.6 percent to 49.6 percent.
Changes in the composition of Korea's external trade, which also
accelerated during the 1930s, reflected the changes in the structure
of output, as Table x.ll indicates. Among the exports, the share of
foods, processed and unprocessed, decreased while the shares of other
consumer goods and of intermediate products both increased. Classi-
fied according to the Brussels Convention, the same data depict a very
substantial shift from raw materials to semi-finished and finished
48
manufactures. Among the imports, the share of machinery and equip-
ment and the share of raw materials for production both rose while the
share of other consumer goods fell. The share of food imports in-
creased at first and decreased subsequently, like the share of imports
from China. Varying imports of food grains from Manchuria, especially
of millet, thus appear to explain both patterns.
Food grain imports became necessary to cover at least in part the
deficit in the food grain balance which the rapidly growing exports of
rice to Japan caused after the First World War. Together with Taiwan,
Korea served as the principal supplier of rice for Japan, but unlike
Taiwan's output, Korea's production of rice could not be increased
fast enough to provide an adequate surplus, which was extracted in the
form of rent and taxes. Rural impoverishment and food crises as a
consequence contributed to rural-urban migration within Korea as well
49
as to emigration to Japan and Manchuria.
In addition to rice (and beans), Korea exported to Japan primarily
an increasing variety of other raw materials and intermediate products^
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Table x. 11
KOREA'S EXTERNAL TRADE BY CATEGORY
Unit: Percent of Tptal Exports/Imports
Period Food, p:rocessed Other consump- Raw material Material for Machlinery,
and unp:rocessed tion goods for production construction equi pment
Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp. Exp. Imp.
1911-15 72.3 19.1 4.5 47.0 22.4 21.3 0.8 7.1 0.0 5.5
1916-20 68.4 18.5 4.7 44.2 26.4 24.7 0.5 6.2 0.0 6.4
1921-25 67.8 21.7 4.4 41.5 25.6 24.4 2.2 8.8 0.1 3.7
1926-30 66.4 24.7 6.3 36.9 25.1 26.3 1.6 6.5 0.2 5.7
1931-35 61.1 17.0 7.7 39.8 28.7 29.9 1.8 6.4 0.7 7.0
1936-38 49.3 14.6 15.0 38.9 32.5 28.1 1.5 7.7 1.7 10.8
Source: Toshiyuk:i Mizoguc;hi, "Foreign Tr ade in Taiwan ai[id Korea under Japanese Rule,"
Hitotsub^ashi Journal of Economics, Vol. 14, No. 2 (February 1974),
,
p. 40.
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Exports of other consumer goods and especially of cotton textiles
apparently went mostly to Manchuria, augmented by transit shipments
from Japan. Conversely, Korea imported from Manchuria in addition to
grains primarily raw materials for production (notably bean cake and
raw silk). Japan provided mostly manufactured goods, which changed in
composition gradually from consumer goods to producer goods, espe-
cially during the 1930s.
Throughout the colonial period, Korea experienced a balance of
trade deficit which at times reached relatively large magnitudes.
Until the later 1930s, however, its commodity account with Japan was
fairly well balanced and even in surplus at times. The dispropor-
tionate provision of services by Japan may have tipped the balance in
the opposite direction. The trade deficits with China and the rest of
the world clearly were not covered by their investments and had to be
met by exports of specie and bullion as well as by remittances from
Koreans residing abroad. Japanese investments may have been financed
in part internally. Balance of payments deficits appear to have been
covered before the 1920s by government transfers and during the 1930s
by long term capital flows.
Conclusion
The Japanese began their modernization efforts under duress, at a time
when the major powers of the time reached the Far East in their quest
to open up and carve up the less developed areas of the world,
imposing "unequal treaties" on Japan as well as on China. Unlike
China and virtually every other country at that time, Japan responded
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very effectively to this challenge. Within a generation, it had
developed sufficiently through free trade, however manipulated, to
emancipate itself from all restrictions on its sovereignty and to pur-
sue instead openly protectionist and imperialist ambitions. Its
integration of Taiwan, Korea, the Kwantung Leased Territory-SMR Zone
and eventually Manchuria into the Japanese Empire and co-prosperity
sphere accelerated the rates of dependent growth of output and trade
in all of these territories to Japanese levels, thereby assuring the
metropolis of food and raw material supplies (without payments prob-
lems) as well as of markets for its not so competitive producer goods.
The rest of China, which expanded and transformed its output and trade
much less rapidly under an "unequal" free trade regime, also provided
food and primary products but served in addition mostly as an outlet
for cotton textiles and other consumer goods, with the opportunity to
convert balance of trade surpluses into foreign exchange. The share
of this China trade remained fairly stable while that of the colonial
trade increased notably. As a result, East Asia's share of Japan's
external trade, which became more and more coterminous with the Yen-
bloc share, grew dramatically, especially during periods of imperial
expansion.
In evaluating this experience, Lockwood among others has argued
that Japan and its dependencies would have fared as well or better if
instead of following the European powers' examples of empire building,
Japan had continued to pursue comparative advantage commercially,
through essentially unmodified free trade. He stresses in particular
that the Pacific War was an inevitable consequence of Japan's con-
frontational strategy, that trade with East Asia was not so critical
because Japan's comparative advantage did not depend on locational
proximity or cultural affinity, and that commercial success in the
East Asian market did not require political domination, whether for-
mally through colonization or informally through participation in the
treaty power system.
The Pacific War no doubt was an exorbitant price, and a discus-
sion of its inevitability goes beyond the scope of this paper. The
assertion that Japan could have gone on trading after 1894 as it had
done until then presumes that the rest of the world and in particular
those principal powers which had colonized much of it were sufficiently
free-trade oriented to accommodate Japan's evolving trade interests.
Yet with few exceptions and not by choice, Japan in fact exported less
to the more developed countries and their colonies than it imported
from them, and it made slow progress in broadening the composition of
its exports. It therefore had reasons to be concerned about payments
problems which could constrain the pace of its growth as well as of
its transformation.
The contention that Japan could have traded as much or more in
East Asia without becoming imperialistic presumes that China and Korea
as well as the Western treaty powers would have responded appropriately
without the use of force, which was not the case. In particular,
China did not grant raost-f avored-nation status, which meant treaty
power status, without military confrontation, and Russia, which had
made great efforts to keep Japan out of the Northeast, gave up its
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concessions in South Manchuria and its sphere of influence in Korea
only after a lost war. Moreover, Japan's full-fledged treaty power
status granted it equal access to the East Asian market but not
necessarily the sought-after changes in trade, which were limited in
particular by the slower pace of East Asia's "semi-autonomous" econom-
ic development.
Japan's resort to colonization and empire-wide protection appeared
to be a solution to both problems. Political domination made it pos-
sible to export not only consumer goods or capital or labor but the
entire system—Americans nowadays might say: of property and agency
rights—which created the environment for accelerated growth. Protec-
tive tariffs added to the incentives to produce food and raw materials
for the Japanese market and to use Japanese producer goods in the
process, which thereby benefitted more extensively from economies of
scale in production. Securing food supplies internally—apparently a
Japanese fixation to this day—in turn limited the payments problems
to less critical purchases abroad, at the expense of the Japanese con-
sumer. Internalizing economic activities more generally helped to
stabilize Japan's as well as its dependencies' growth, also at the
cost of sacrificing some comparative advantage.
Throughout its colonial period, Japan thus traded off improvements
in efficiency for more rapid and more stable development, with notable
success especially during the 1930s. The increases in production and
52trade evidently benefitted the Japanese, no doubt more so as pro-
ducers than as consumers. As a means to this end, the colonial
development efforts may have had positive effects on the existential
-50-
conditions there as well, the colonizers' exactions notwithstanding.
But the evidence is not uniformly positive. In addition to infra-
structure generally, public health and basic education seem to have
improved in all dependencies. Real wages increased in Taiwan by more
53
than one percent per annum until the late 1930s according to Ho.
Real wages were much higher in Manchuria than in North China (and in
Korea), accounting for the immigration from both regions, but fell
54
also during the inflation of the late 1930s. A similar decline is
indicated for Korea according to Kuznets, who concludes generally that
"... growth may not have brought substantial benefits to most Koreans
during the colonial era ..." and that "... the average Korean did not
benefit from industrialization and expansion of trade. ..."
In comparison, average per capita consumption in China grew by 0.5
percent per annum during 1914/18 - 1931/36 according to Rawski '
s
calculations or stagnated during the same interval as an implication
of the Perkins and Yeh estimates, followed by the same kind of
decline which is evident for the other parts of China during the late
1930s. The similarity of the magnitudes suggests that on the average,
people in the colonized areas did not fare any worse and perhaps some-
what better than those in the Republic, in spite of the impositions
put on them. Cui bono?
-51-
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